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JOINT LECTURE

ADDRESS

By

Honorable James R. Schlesinger

Presented at
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Host: The National War College
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ADMIRAL BAYNE: /Introduced the speaker./

DR. SCHLESINGER: Thank you, Admiral Bayne, for that kind introduction. I am not sure I would say the same things 14 years later than I said 14 years earlier. I think that somewhere in that book, if I recall correctly, there is a reference to Napoleon's dictum that in war the moral factors outweigh the economic factors by three to one, or something of that magnitude. I think I would place far more emphasis on morale than I would on pure economics or pure resource constraints.

I do not think you want from me this morning any pontifical remarks on the fact that you are commencing a new phase of your life as officers. I presume that all of you know why you are here, and if there is any question in your minds, I probably could not help very well to straighten it out.

I broke into this business by serving at the Naval War College many years ago. Admiral Kidd lived next door to me. Those of you in the Navy will be delighted to know that Admiral Kidd professed (I will put this delicately) to complain that he really preferred driving destroyers around the Atlantic than being up at the Naval War College and he did not see much purpose in being there.

I ran into Dennis Wilkinson some time ago. He had forgotten that he had been a student at the Naval War College while I was an instructor there. The impact of those lectures seemed to have evaporated completely. /Laughter/ I had to remind him of the fact. Anyway, I am sure that you will be far superior students and that you will recall all of the lectures that you have during the course of your year here. No one can ever predict what might turn up in the future.

I will not spend the time reading a speech. I am sure you did not come here to see how well I read a speech. I think there is a prepared speech, which you are all welcome to read at your pleasure. What I will try to do is spend as much time as possible answering your questions and start with some introductory comments.

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Let me deal with the first one: Why does the United States maintain military forces; secondly, why we maintain the military forces that we do or we should; and, third, what are the problems that we face as a society today in the maintenance of an appropriate force structure.

Let me start with the first one: Why does the United States maintain military forces in an era of detente?

I submit that there are a large number of people who believe that defense is now obsolescent or obsolete in the atmosphere in which we live, since there is cooling between the two major parties on the international scene that we can substantially reduce or further reduce defense expenditures and devote these resources to various types of domestic goodies.

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✓
The Soviets apparently see no conflict between detente and defense. The Soviet defense budgets have been increasing by approximately 5 percent a year. Military forces have grown from three million men to approximately 3.6 million men since 1960 despite the fact that the United States has reduced its force structure by approximately 30 percent since FY 1969. The growth of Soviet forces has proceeded apace 5 percent per year in terms of resources, and you are familiar with the build-up of those forces.

For those who believe that if the United States were to reduce its forces that the Soviets would emulate this moral posture of the United States, there is a long history which suggests that they would be disappointed. The Soviets have shown no such proclivity, and we must keep in mind that we maintain our forces primarily because of the power of the Soviet Union and its associates in the Warsaw Pact. We cannot afford to rely upon the sense of self-restraint, good will, forbearance, or generosity of the Warsaw Pact. It is true that the climate of international relations has improved dramatically in recent years, but the reason for that dramatic improvement may well be associated with the policies of strength that the United States has adhered to in the years at least since the Korean War.

Those who would further disarm tend to point to this improved climate, but the Soviets still possess a mailfist, even though it is more obviously encased in a velvet glove than previously.

We maintain our forces in order to achieve deterrence and, if deterrence fails, to prosecute a war, a war which, if we maintain the right array of forces, will permit us in some sense to come out ahead.

Let me turn to the second problem, which is why we maintain the specific set of forces that we maintain.

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We do not maintain these forces to protect primarily the North American continent or the U.S. ZI. If our sole concern were protection of the North American continent, we could reduce our defense budgets probably by 30 or \$40 billion easily. The reason that our forces are as large as they are is because of our overseas commitments and our desire to continue to live in a world in which there is free exchange among states that have by and large a set of values and a degree of openness in which the values that have characterized the United States can continue to flourish on the world scene not merely in terms of the North American continent.

✓ The overall setting is provided by strategic forces, and since roughly the Second World War, American strategic forces which have been paramount until the mid-sixties provided the crutch on which all of the Western nations could rest. And sometimes they could rest sufficiently so that they could go to sleep with regard to the need for complementary forces. We need, as the primacy of the U.S. strategic posture has waned, a set of complementary forces which maintains an overall balance so that in the types of wars that we may, if deterrence fails, be forced to fight we can indeed come out ahead.

✓ Nobody is likely to start deliberately a nuclear war. The probabilities of that are extremely low. The way nuclear war will get started will be escalation from a lower level conflict in which miscalculations occurred. And of particular concern continues to be the posture along the NATO frontiers in which the Soviets, if they believe that we do not have the will to resist or the conventional forces to resist, may believe that a conventional grab will not in fact be resisted by our Alliance and consequently that they will be tempted through the weaknesses of our American posture and Alliance posture to make such a grab.

For this reason NATO must remain strong. We talk in terms of a NATO triad, consisting of conventional, tactical nuclear and strategic forces just as in a different context we talk about a triad of strategic forces. But the United States cannot in NATO do the job alone. It must do it in collaboration with its allies, who will be obligated to provide at least, say, 50 percent of the ready forces and the reserve forces for NATO. If our allies are unprepared to make those kinds of sacrifices in order to provide those kinds of forces, the American forces alone cannot protect in a conventional war the NATO boundaries. Consequently, we are thrust back on the use of either tactical nuclear or strategic nuclear weapons in the hope that they may deter a foe that we presume under those circumstances to be unaggressive. We leave a gap in our overall deterrent posture, and the reason that we wish to maintain a conventional capability which is formidable for the NATO war is to avoid leaving that kind of gap that would tempt our opponents.

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In addition to the strategic forces and the conventional forces for NATO, we maintain additional forces to deal with some contingencies which are difficult to specify in regard to involvements on the ground.

As you know, the formal statements of American strategic policy are that we now maintain forces for one and a half wars. One of the wars is quite clear: the NATO context. The half-a-war is difficult to specify, particularly as the American proclivity to fight a ground war on Asia, at least for the time being, seems to be attenuated.

In addition to these capabilities, we must maintain naval forces, and as Soviet power on the sea builds up, we maintain naval forces increasingly to protect the sea lanes. And there is some small shift of emphasis away from the protection of power ashore to the protection of the sea lanes.

In each of these contexts -- strategic forces, NATO forces and naval forces -- it is clear that we must maintain a balance that in the event of challenge hopefully will be superior to the forces that an opponent can bring against us and will be perceived continually to be superior by the opponent so that those forces will not be challenged.

/CHART S-1 - Force Characteristics Providing Challenge
Under the Interim Agreement/

Let me start with some comments on strategic forces.

This is the position in which we emerged from the SALT I discussion. There was a rough parity that was perceived between the forces on both sides. The United States had some major advantages with regard to technology and MIRVs and RVs, guidance and the technology of nuclear warheads which permits us to maintain despite the lower number of launchers and throw weight for the United States, forces which were markedly stronger than those of the Soviets in terms of the numbers of RVs, which compensated for the Soviet advantage in terms of gross megatonnage, numbers of launchers and throw weight. These, of course, are the Soviet advantages. I point to the ones that were recognized at the time and the very impressive potential advantage, which was a very aggressive Soviet program to develop new missile systems which incorporated U.S. technologies or their equivalent.

The overall balance and the U.S. position is based upon waning Advantages, in a relative sense

Our purpose at SALT I was to limit the then Soviet advantages in terms of the development of large numbers of launchers and to break the momentum of their deployment program of ICBMs and SLBMs. The problem we face is that the /

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cannot be acceptable to the United States over the longer period of time. With improved technologies represented by what the United States already has and the exploitation of its throw weight, the Soviet forces can potentially in the 1980s clearly outclass the forces of the United States. We cannot, I think, allow such a set of circumstances to develop.

/CHART S-2 - U.S. Strategic Objectives/

I think these are the principal objectives for which the United States maintains its strategic forces.

Let me stress this objective: We must maintain an image of politico-military equality with the Soviet Union because we are dealing not only with a bipolar world in which many people have made their analyses and in which arms controllers tend to think for the reason they tend to think in these terms is when you add third parties, it becomes so complicated that you cannot analyze the issue properly.

It is evident, for example, that if the United States intends to maintain forces which are as large as those of the Soviet Union and China, and the Russians wish to maintain forces as large as those of the U.S. and China, and the Chinses insist on going ahead with missile development, you have an explosive situation in an arms control sense. The conclusion, if you happen to be an analyst, is do not think about the problem; just look at it in the bipolar context. /Laughter/

We must remember the United States has provided over the years strategic forces which defend not only the North American continent, the U.S. ZI, but extended deterrence for the NATO Alliance as well as commitments made during the Johnson Administration to provide guarantees against nuclear attack virtually around the world.

We certainly desire to develop a strategic edge in terms of hypothetical war-fighting capabilities against a slowly reacting Soviet Union. It is no longer the case that the United States is in a position to threaten to bust up Soviet cities simply as a result of Soviet incursion against Western Europe. The set of circumstances, the range of circumstances in which the United States will choose the city-busting strategic option are narrower than they were years ago before the Soviets had an effective counter deterrent. This is one of our objectives that tends to be stressed to quite an extent.

/CHART S-5 without overlay - Reciprocal Counterforce Capabilities, Soviet Union and the United States/

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the Soviets do in fact acquire the technologies that the Americans presently possess, given the fact that their throw weight and ICBMs outclass the U.S. in terms of four to one, even if we continue to assign to the Soviets a lower CEP in the early 1980s than the United States possesses, with that throw weight, the fact that they can put about 7,000 one-megaton RVs on board their ICBM forces with approximately 20 percent of their force, they can reduce us in this hypothetical case to about 100 missiles. By contrast, the United States, using 30 percent of the force, would leave the Soviets with something on the order of 350 or 400 missiles given the assumption about CEP.

[OVERLAY ADDED]

One of our problems, however, is that with the very small yields in the U.S. missile force as opposed to the perspective large yields in the Soviet MIRV force, any degradation of CEP works dramatically against the United States.

The effect of this is that the United States might in the early eighties be facing a situation in which the Soviet Union has the option of using counterforce against the United States while the United States does not possess that option. Circumstances in which the Soviets have 7,000 one-megaton RVs on their ICBMs and the U.S. has 3,000 170-k.t. RVs are not circumstances which are likely to fortify the will of any President of the United States in the early 1980s. That is why I stress the importance not only of the ability to bust up Soviet cities and to have an assured destruction capability despite Soviet first strike, but, in addition, to have a set of strategic forces which are perceived around the world as in some sense balanced.

[CHART C-1 - Center Region, The Conventional Balance -- Europe]

Similarly in the NATO context, we must continue to have what are perceived to be a rough balance of forces, in my judgment. That, once again, depends on the collaboration of our allies.

At the present time, despite a good deal of pessimism about the overall balance in the center region of NATO, just in purely quantitative terms there is not so obvious a discrepancy that the Soviets feel confident. As a matter of fact, Soviet intelligence shows pretty much the same picture as I have illustrated here: the forces numerically are roughly balanced. NATO has a major weakness in terms of tanks, but they have advantages in terms of antitank weapons. There is some discrepancy with regard to ground forces in numerical terms, and that discrepancy in numerical terms probably understates the real discrepancy and the fact that the forces of the NATO Alliance are more poorly trained, subject to greater turmoil, that there are serious command/control problems that exist amongst a set of more or less equal allies, each of which maintains independent sovereignty. The cohesion of

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the NATO Alliance as it impacts the performance of the forces on the ground is particularly of concern, but that is a qualitative aspect, and we should pay attention to those qualitative aspects. But we should recognize that in simple quantitative measures that there isn't that great a discrepancy.

The air power represented by the United States in particular and the Alliance in general should be the great equalizer in terms of obtaining a conventional balance in NATO. This measure understates the qualitative advantages that are possessed by the United States and by the Alliance in terms of aircraft. Our aircraft are more costly, for one thing. They have far greater range, far greater payload. They are designed for the attack mission as opposed to most Soviet aircraft, which were designed for the intercept mission. There is no doubt that if we were to utilize the air assets properly that they could serve the role of offsetting the disadvantages to some extent of NATO forces on the ground.

There is some proclivity to take a very pessimistic view of the NATO balance. In Napoleon's dictum on moral factors that may be advisable, but in terms of the pure resources going in and the assets available, there is, at least in the center region of NATO, a balance which is not unimpressive and, more important than that, can be further strengthened.

interesting →
I have no slide to present to you the picture with regard to the naval forces, but once again it is clear that the United States, which is isolated, far away from the world island, must as a maritime power, maintain sufficient naval strength so it can control the sea lanes. The entire Western Alliance, in fact the set of American alliances, including Japan, depend upon free communications by sea. If the Soviets are in a position permanently to interdict these channels of communication, the Alliance collapses in and of itself.

What are our problems?

The first problem that we face is the problem of public opinion, public opinion in a democracy in a period of time in which the public quite visibly is tired of our involvements, tired of the burdens that it has carried for 25 years.

/CHART A-1 - De Tocqueville's Challenge/

Democracies historically have not always stood the test of challenge. I think this was recognized by an early student of the American democracy, Alexis de Tocqueville in his study of the U.S. in the mid-nineteenth century. Especially in the conduct of their foreign relations democracies appear to me decidedly inferior to other governments. A democracy can only with great difficulty regulate the details of an important undertaking, persevere in a fixed design and work out its execution in spite of serious obstacles. It cannot combine its measures with

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secrecy (that has a certain poignancy these days [Laughter]) or await their consequences with patience.

I think that represents the challenge for the United States. It represents a challenge for all of the Western democracies. Forces move today much more rapidly than they did in the 1920s or 1930s, and the democracies in Europe did not stand up very well against the challenge of that period of time. They preferred to comfort themselves with self-deception, that there was really no risk, that their opponents never would attack.

We cannot be in a position in which, as I said at the outset, we are depending upon the forbearance and generosity of potential opponents. We must have a set of forces which balances their capabilities so that they are not tempted to attack.

The next problem we have in maintaining these forces is credibility.

I would be remiss if I did not point out that the credibility of the military establishment and the Department of Defense is not at its high-water mark at the present time. Part of this is the fault of the Services themselves. There is a kind of "gung-ho" attitude; we are going to sweep away all difficulties. After a period of five, six, or seven years of listening to intelligence briefings which perceived each and every day of the week light at the end of the tunnel, the credibility on the Hill, at least, for the military establishment is quite low.

I think this is part of an admirable characteristic of the military "goddam, it-can-do" outfit--"We're going to win next week, if you'll just give us the resources"--and a disinclination, incidentally, to list all of the assumptions which are necessary to achieving victory. I think it is plain that the military, at least, were not responsible for the ground rules of the Vietnamese war. There has been a tendency for the civilians to burrow down behind the military. This is not a new tendency. It has gone on for at least 25 years, to my knowledge, and probably a lot longer than that. I think the civilians had the primary responsibility for organizing the way that we fought in Vietnam, what the objectives were and what the constraints were. As long as there is civilian control of the military, I think it is necessary to recognize the corollary of that, which is civilian responsibility, but that corollary is not always recognized. So part of the credibility problem comes, not from the performance of the U.S. Services but from the circumstances in which the Services found themselves by following legitimate civilian orders and for which they are improperly blamed. That does not necessarily lessen the credibility problem.

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A third difficulty that we have is with regard to the costs of the military establishment.

We shall have to face the fact that we are going to have steady budgets, at best, in real terms.

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[CHART B-5 - Outlook to 1980, \$ Billions Fiscal Years] We are going to have steady budgets in real terms until and unless there is a shift in public opinion.

As you will note, in these out-years, GNP is increasing at the rate of about a hundred billion dollars a year, which is not an insignificant rate of expansion. Defense will be increasing by about four or five billion dollars a year, about 4 percent. As a result of this, the defense share of the federal budget, which is now down to about 29 percent, will fall during the rest of the decade to about 23 percent. The defense share of GNP will continue downward from about 5.3 percent, where it will be in FY 74, to about 5 percent in FY 80.

I do not think we need worry too much about our share of GNP as long as the absolute level of resources is adequate. There is some question of whether it will be adequate. That depends in part upon the performance of our potential foes. If Soviet budgets continue to grow at 5 percent per annum, it is not obvious that the United States can remain stable in terms of real resources and still maintain the balance that I spoke of earlier.

We shall have to do a better job with regard to bringing in weapons systems at appropriate costs. In recent years the building in of high technology, high-cost weapons systems, has resulted in a set of circumstances that if you replace the existing U.S. force structure with the equipments now available as a result of high-cost, high-technology designs, it would cost us on the order of \$45 billion a year in procurement dollars, and regrettably, or understandably (depending on your point of view), that kind of money just is not available. We shall, therefore, have to look at reduction of the average unit costs.

As you know, since World War II, the cost of an aircraft has increased by a factor of 100. There is some skepticism whether performance of aircraft has increased by a factor of a hundred. The cost of a tank has increased about tenfold. The Army has got into the game of high technology about a decade later than the Air Force and the Navy, but they are now attempting to make up for lost time!

Whose fault is it?

I think part of the fault lies with the Services once again, but the fault also lies with Senator Proxmire and myself, by which I mean the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Congress. The Services have not been given any incentive to hold

in FY 74, procurement was 25% of DoD budget

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down the cost of individual weapons systems. Their very incentive has been to run up the cost.

→ LAIRD or McN?

During the sixties the Services were given a fixed force structure -- 15 CVAs, 9 CVSS, 16-1/3 divisions, 21 air groups, tactical air wings or whatever it was. They were given a force structure and told the budgets were open-ended. Under those circumstances they had every incentive to run up the per-unit cost. They had no incentive whatsoever to hold down per-unit costs because the force structure was frozen. They were not given a budget and told, "Here's the amount of money that you're getting. If you can squeeze 17 divisions or 16 carriers out of that amount of money, go to it! We want a force structure that will further reduce the level of risk, if you can bring it in at that budget level." And, of course, Congress is doing the same thing at the present time.

I think we have to get out of that habit. We should be providing budget guidance which provides an incentive to the Services to reduce the unit cost for new weapons systems. What has happened is that in the sixties the Services were encouraged, not explicitly but de facto, to run up the per-unit cost of weapons systems, so that you ran into the billion-dollar carrier and the \$15-million aircraft and the \$1-million tank. In the seventies it turned out that the budgets were not open-ended. As a result, one has either an obsolescence or a shrinkage of the general purpose force structure.

I do not think that we can tolerate that since the resources available will not be growing rapidly. The only alternative that we have is to reduce the unit cost of weapons systems.

We talk these days about a high-low weapons mix. That sounds very good. It is probably rationalization. First we are buying the high side and perspectively at some future point in time we buy the low side. /laughter/ It is a rationalization of the fact that the only weapons systems we have available at the present time are the high-cost ones. We recognize that if we continue to attempt to buy those high-cost systems, the force structure is going to shrink unduly. So, instead of attempting at the outset to obtain a set of equipments which are purchasable within some reasonable aggregate level of resources and to buy and equip the forces with these equipments, we are producing a set of forces which are less than optimally balanced. But given the circumstances in which we find ourselves today, I do not think there is any alternative.

An additional problem that we have is the problem of articulation.

The days of ex cathedra pronouncements from the Department of Defense on what we need are gone. That is associated with the Approved For Release 2000/01/29 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003500170001-9

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and to the Congress for what purposes the U.S. needs forces, why the forces cost what they do, why explicitly in each area of the world we maintain the level of forces that we do. Unless we are able to articulate those arguments, we will be swept aside by what is the current nostalgia for the pre-World War II years.

In doing so, we face our final problem, which is candor. Let me encourage all of you to be as candid as you possibly can be in your analyses, in your discussions within the Service or within these institutions. One of the advantages of these institutions should be and has been that they encourage candor within the building.

> Our Services, of course, are large organizations. There is a good deal of emphasis on team play and going along with the current party line and the rest of it. That, in the present climate of opinion, is not a profitable course to follow. As I have indicated, we must articulate why we need equipments, forces, and sometimes the party line tends to slide over some of the weak points in the argument. There is a whole set of people on the Hill, in places like Brookings, and so forth, who are searching out the weak points of the arguments. Therefore, the arguments for the maintenance of our forces must be very effective. Otherwise we will be continuing to face the pressures from the Hill for the reduction of budgets.

I do not think the present level of resources is immutable. There are circumstances in which the level of resources might be lower than it is at the present time. The only set of circumstances that I can see is a major reduction of capabilities in the Soviet Union. I do not think that it is immutable in the sense that it has to stay at the present level. If there is a change in the international climate, it is quite possible that there will be a change in public opinion in the United States which will bring a greater flow of resources to the Department of Defense.

But that flow of resources should not reinstitute a set of bad habits with regard to running up the cost of equipments and the rest. The better job that we can do in terms of articulating the desirability of the maintenance of our force levels or improvement of those forces as circumstances require, resisting the impulse to reach for more simply because it is there like Everest, the greater will be the contribution toward the long-run credibility of the Department and the ability of the Department to maintain balanced forces in a stable condition as opposed to going through the cycle of feast and famine that has characterized the U.S. force posture over many years.

Gentlemen, I am ready for your questions.

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SUMMARY

Compensatory force restructuring may be the only viable way for NATO to maintain a credible deterrent/defense posture in event of sizable MBFR cuts. Otherwise, such cuts would probably further accentuate NATO's existing Center Region military deficiencies vis-à-vis the Warsaw Pact.

Indeed the need for restructuring to optimize NATO's conventional defense posture is driven by other factors too. The advent of nuclear parity is making adequate conventional defense even more essential, at the very time when escalating weapons and manpower costs are making it more expensive. And this is occurring at a time when lessened tensions and competitive demands for funds to meet domestic needs are simultaneously exerting pressure on defense budgets. Something will have to give -- even in the absence of MBFR. In all likelihood, NATO will have to do more with less.

Fortunately, NATO is already within reach of a higher confidence conventional posture, even within likely manpower and budget constraints. After all, NATO spends comparably to the Warsaw Pact and fields as much active manpower, even in the Center Region. How, then, does the WP manage to produce such a high order of conventional threat to NATO, while NATO produces from comparable inputs a posture which, by its own estimate, is at best marginally capable of effective defense?

THE SOURCES OF NATO CONVENTIONAL INFERIORITY

Some reasons for this striking paradox (such as sheer geographic differences, the likely WP advantage of the initiative, or that NATO is a loose 14-nation coalition compared to the USSR-dominated WP) are more or less inherent in the differing nature of the WP and NATO situations, thus difficult to change. But to a great extent NATO's inferiority vis-à-vis the WP springs from the different ways in which the two sides chosen to allocate their defense budgets and posture their forces.

In brief, the Pact (led by the USSR) has gone a long way toward optimizing a conventional force posture aimed at precluding NATO's development of its greater war potential by an armored and air blitzkrieg

offensive. It has maximized its short-run combat power by: (1) structuring deliberately to overwhelm NATO's thin ready forces in the crucial Center Region; (2) finding ways to minimize logistical support so that more resources can be channeled into armor-heavy combat units; (3) integrating much training and schooling into its operational structure; (4) organizing into smaller, leaner units than its NATO counterparts; (5) using a quick mobilization system, based on large numbers of active but under-strength or cadre divisions which can be rapidly fleshed out and readied for combat; and (6) using a unit replacement system to sustain offensive momentum by replacing whole divisions as they are used up in the offensive. Via these techniques, the USSR and its allies have produced a force which our own generals tell us could quickly swamp NATO unless it went nuclear.

(U) In strong contrast, the NATO defenders have chosen to dispose their comparable resource inputs across a much wider spectrum of capabilities than would seem optimum in terms of this WP threat. The resultant asymmetries between the WP and NATO postures go far to explain why NATO is so conventionally inferior in the crucial Center Region. They feed the myth that an effective conventional defense is impossible, at least without massive added defense outlays.

(U) While the WP invests the bulk of its GPF budget and active manpower in creating an armor-heavy threat to the NATO center, no major NATO power except the FRG invests a comparable portion of its conventional force budget in meeting this blitzkrieg threat. Indeed, it is notable how modest a proportion is devoted primarily to initial defense of the NATO center. Even granting the many reasons for the diversion of NATO military resources to other purposes (the perceived low likelihood of WP attack, confidence in the U.S. nuclear umbrella, the need to posture against other contingencies, national desires to maintain balanced forces, the need to hedge against a longer conflict), we nonetheless argue that NATO has never optimized its defense posture to meet what it claims to regard as the most serious threat.

(S) Many of NATO's military deficiencies are brought out in the AD-70 and NSDM-95 studies. These essentially call only for modest incremental improvements across the whole range of NATO forces and capabilities. They do not question NATO's force structure or basic pattern of resource

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allocation. But we would argue that NATO's deficiencies are much more structural in nature than suggested by AD-70 or NSDM-95. Moreover, neither takes adequately into account the even greater constraints on budgetary and manpower levels that are now emerging -- as a result of which it may prove impossible in the Seventies to simply maintain NATO's existing force structure and modernize it.

(S) Nor did AD-70 or NSDM-95 deal with one of NATO's most serious conventional deficiencies -- insufficient ground combat forces which thus have to be too thinly stretched along the many feasible routes of WP advance to permit defense in depth. Also lacking are sufficient mobile reserves to seal off penetrations and counterattack. Hence, NATO must trade space for time, and cannot even implement its so-called forward strategy.

(U) Why does NATO generate so few divisions from comparable manpower to the Pact? Besides allocating its resources to many other purposes, it structures its forces in fewer larger divisions, and has a much higher ratio of support to combat troops. This structure is designed to be indefinitely sustainable in extended conflict. The U.S. contribution in particular is organized on a manpower-expensive "expeditionary force" basis, largely because the United States still has to provide most of its own logistic support. Nor, because of its excessive fear of surprise attack, does NATO stress quickly mobilizable reserve divisions or quickly deployable reinforcements to counter the WP's rapid estimated buildup from 61 divisions (many at reduced strength) on M-day to an estimated 86 - at full strength by M+30. Ironically, NATO plans to mobilize far more personnel than the WP, but even after mobilization NATO ground forces at any rate remain people-rich and combat-unit poor.

(S) Another glaring anomaly in NATO's posture is the different wars for which the United States and its allies seem to be preparing, and the resultant poor fit between their force postures. The European NATO countries seem to be posturing primarily only for a short conventional phase, as indicated by their WRM goal of only 30 days, and lack of reserve divisions. Yet the U.S. goal is 90 days WRM in Europe, and it maintains an extensive reserve structure suitable only for extended conflict. The various U.S. services also seem to be preparing for different kinds of war.

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viii

While the USAF is posturing for an early peaking of the air war, the Army is planning on gradually sending massive reinforcements to Europe peaking well after D+30 days, and the U.S. Navy is planning on at least a 90-day ASW campaign at sea. In sum, NATO's posture does not seem very consistent with its strategy; it does not seem to have sorted out its priorities very well.

(U) Given all these weaknesses and anomalies, it is easy to see how roughly equal MBFR cuts as posited in this study would further accentuate NATO inferiority. Of course NATO could rely even more heavily on nuclear deterrence, but this alternative is much less credible than before in an era of nuclear parity. Yet likely political pressures to reduce defense budgets, despite rising manpower and weapons costs, will also make achieving a credible conventional capability harder than before. Should MBFR withdrawals of U.S. forces add to this dilemma, it also would become imperative to reassure our allies that the United States was not in effect giving up on NATO conventional defense.

(U) Hence we believe that a viable post-MBFR NATO posture must meet three key criteria: (1) militarily, it must be adequate for conventional defense and deterrence; (2) economically, it must be fundable within likely budget and manpower ceilings; and (3) politically, it must suffice to reassure our allies that NATO is not being undermined. How can NATO cope with these largely conflicting imperatives?

THE CASE FOR NATO FORCE RESTRUCTURING (U)

(U) There is an answer to this dilemma, through restructuring NATO's force posture to actually implement the NSDM-95 concept of doing first things first. This may be the only viable way to achieve a credible NATO conventional defense despite sizable MBFR cuts, combined with likely budget and manpower constraints. Indeed, the latter constraints will probably dictate much force restructuring even without MBFR. In this event, the NATO powers will be compelled to take a harder look at what existing defense missions, outlays, and capabilities can be modified or sacrificed to free up resources for higher priority needs.

(S) On the other hand, if NATO will only face up to these hard choices, it is well within reach of a high confidence initial defense.

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Fortunately, there is ample room for tradeoffs within the massive sums the NATO powers would still be spending. But in our view, this would entail such new departures as:

(S) 1. Accepting the calculated risk of posturing on the assumption that NATO could prudently count on more mobilization/deployment time, since (among other reasons) MBFR cuts would also slow down WP ability to mount a quick, overwhelming attack.

(S) 2. Giving higher priority to initial defense against the short, blitzkrieg offensive for which the WP is postured, if necessary at the expense of capabilities for more sustained conflict. Until NATO achieves a higher confidence initial defensive capability, can it afford to divert so many resources to hedging against a longer conflict or other lower priority needs? It seems fruitless for the United States in particular to continue posturing for a sustained effort if our allies are not doing the same.

(U) 3. Fielding additional ground combat forces to provide defense in depth against an armor-heavy WP attack, via the measures cited below.

(U) 4. Designing smaller, leaner divisions tailored more for initial combat power than for staying power, and with a lower ratio of combat to support troops, as probably the only way to generate such forces within likely resource and MBFR constraints.

(U) 5. Going much further than currently planned toward strengthening NATO anti-tank capabilities.

(U) 6. Greatly speeding up U.S. capabilities to reinforce the NATO Center with both ground and air forces, as perhaps the best single means of offsetting U.S. troop withdrawals under MBFR.

(U) 7. Generating more quickly mobilizable allied reserve divisions and territorial forces, as a means of thickening up the NATO shield while still absorbing MBFR cuts and reducing manpower costs.

(S) 8. Revamping NATO's Center Region air posture, to increase survivability and flexibility at low cost.

(U) 9. Making fuller use of low cost technology and other compensatory measures (e.g. civilianization and greater U.S. use of allied wartime assets) to offset manpower cuts.

(U) 10. Rationalizing NATO's defense posture, via such means as joint logistics and collocated basing to economize on resources. This

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would also facilitate more equitable burden-sharing from the U.S. standpoint.

This study argues that by such means NATO can attain a credible defense capability vis-à-vis the WP, even after MBFR cuts, at no added cost in resource inputs. It attacks the myth that an effective conventional defense is unattainable without massive budget and manpower increases; hence that NATO must resign itself to an inferiority that foreordains defeat or nuclear escalation in event of Pact attack. Nor would any change in NATO's existing "flexible response" strategy be required. What is needed instead is to revamp its force posture to make the existing strategy more realizable than before.

The rest of this study applies the above concepts to (1) ways of absorbing 10-30 percent MBFR personnel cuts with least impact on residual NATO capabilities; and (2) low cost compensatory measures to reassure our allies and enhance NATO deterrence/initial defense.* We focus mostly on U.S. forces, particularly ground forces, which comprise 80 percent of U.S. manpower in the NGA. While our detailed proposals may be flawed in some respects, we are convinced they point generally in the direction NATO will have to travel if it is to achieve adequate conventional deterrence and defense within likely resource constraints.

ABSORBING MBFR CUTS IN U.S. ARMY FORCES IN EUROPE

The "school solution" would be to absorb 10-30 percent MBFR cuts in U.S. Army personnel in Europe by withdrawing essentially a proportional slice of the present force -- combat as well as support troops. This would leave a balanced residual force and do minimum violence to USAREUR's existing structure. In this event, we recommend that such cuts be made by brigade or battalion slices, rather than division slices. Keeping even understrength division and corps structures in Europe would: (1) help reassure our allies; (2) permit us to keep manning our sector of the NATO front; (3) facilitate the rapid reinforcement on which our post-MBFR posture would be critically dependent; and (4) permit leaving the

* An Annex to this Summary (pp. xx-xxx) outlines the 158 specific proposals made to this end in the study.

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equipment of troops withdrawn with the parent units, thus providing low cost prepositioning. All these advantages far outweigh the complications of withdrawing by less than division slices. However, we believe that such balanced cuts are far from optimum.

Instead, we recommend taking MBFR cuts in an unbalanced manner, mostly from USAREUR's large "expeditionary force" support structure. We suggest ways in which up to 52,750 spaces could be cut from Army support personnel in lieu of withdrawing maneuver units. The rationale would be to cut logistic and sustaining instead of initial combat capabilities, and to rely more on local civilian or mobilized wartime European support. The largest cuts would be in engineers (7,150) signal personnel (8,100), maintenance (13,000), transport (3,800), and food services (3,200). We also propose cutting 9,350 air defense spaces by shifting high altitude Nike battalions to the FRG or relying on interceptors, reduction of vulnerability by dispersal of stocks, etc. Merging TASCOM, USAREUR, and EUCOM headquarters (in event of major cuts, pruning some headquarters would be politically essential), plus reducing special mission forces like the Berlin garrison, would yield an additional 4,400 spaces. Taking all the savings proposed would permit over a 23 percent MBFR cut in U.S. military personnel in the NGA, while still retaining 4-1/3 divisions, the two ACRs, all artillery, and the like.

To help meet NATO's crucial need for enough ready divisions for initial defense in depth (with sufficient reserves to counter Pact penetrations), we also propose restructuring USAREUR division forces. A modest option would be to eliminate such marginalia as infantry company 81-mm mortar platoons, maneuver battalion radar sections, and three assault helicopter companies better suited for Vietnam than Europe, for a net saving of 3,250 spaces. If these are not needed to help fill out MBFR cuts, we suggest converting them (and 1,750 engineer spaces saved earlier) into: (1) four more mechanized battalions; (2) five more tank battalions; and (3) either three AT helicopter companies or (together with other existing USAREUR aviation assets) a highly flexible AT helicopter brigade designed to help blunt major Soviet armor penetrations. These tradeoffs would substantially augment USAREUR's present thin combat strength.

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A more far-reaching alternative would be to convert USAREUR's present 4-1/3 divisions into one-third smaller lean divisions specifically tailored to meet the WP threat. These divisions would still retain comparable firepower and have much larger anti-tank weapon strength. Their structure would facilitate rapid fleshing out by adding fourth companies to maneuver battalions. Going to a 9,600 instead of 15,400-man peacetime armored division and a 9,300-man instead of 15,426-man mechanized division would permit either saving 26,000 more spaces or converting to seven new-style USAREUR divisions while still absorbing a 20 percent MBFR cut from non-divisional units. Granted that such a force would be very lean, thin in sustaining power, and much more dependent upon European logistic support. But it might be the best way to absorb large MBFR cuts, yet still preserve a major U.S. defense contribution to NATO Center Region defense and reassure our allies -- all within likely budget constraints.

ABSORBING MBFR CUTS IN USAFE

While current U.S. thinking is not to make any MBFR cuts in our air forces in Europe, we show how USAFE too could absorb 10-30 percent cuts if necessary, mostly from support personnel without reducing much initial combat strength. Since USAFE is structured to rapidly absorb large reinforcements soon after M-day, however, cuts much over 10 percent or so would seriously degrade this capability -- even if its peacetime combat aircraft strength were kept up for political reassurance purposes. In fact, planning to deploy U.S. air reinforcements more quickly than presently contemplated would help greatly to compensate for MBFR cuts in general. But to this end the United States must insist on pre-planned or if possible peacetime collocation on up to 20 allied air bases desired by USAFE, this would at low cost greatly enhance USAFE ability to absorb massive, quick reinforcements and increase their survivability, while providing the best means of absorbing any MBFR cuts in U.S. air forces as well.

CIVILIANIZATION AND GREATER RELIANCE ON EUROPEAN SUPPORT

Another way to compensate for MBFR cuts in U.S. forces would be greater substitution of civilians and civilian contractors.

reliance on mobilized European forces, to replace U.S. personnel in less sensitive functions. The range of possible savings would be from at least 17,000 to over 20,000 spaces.* Such substitutions would involve a calculated risk in terms of: (1) less U.S. control over its own logistic support; (2) reduced flexibility to meet non-NATO contingencies; and (3) possibly less wartime reliability. But these must be weighed against the alternative of withdrawing combat forces under MBFR, and the need to rationalize NATO's defense posture. NATO can no longer afford the outdated concept that logistics are a national responsibility, if it is still to field an adequate defense in the Seventies while absorbing MBFR cuts.

(U) Indeed, the United States could use MBFR as a potent lever to get our allies to assume many support functions we have had to perform up to now ourselves. The prospect that U.S. combat troops would have to be withdrawn unless our allies took over such functions might provide these allies a powerful incentive. This would permit sizable U.S. cost savings without parallel increases in allied peacetime costs, since much of the allied costs would be incurred only in wartime. In effect, MBFR and consequent restructuring could be used to secure more equitable NATO burden sharing via a new formula of shared responsibility which might be more palatable to our allies than the increasingly painful haggles over offsets.

QUICKER REINFORCEMENT AND RICHER ACTIVE/RESERVE FORCE MIXES (U)

(S) Since NATO badly needs more divisions for defense in depth against a WP blitzkrieg, speeding up planned U.S. ground reinforcements would help greatly, as well as compensate for MBFR cuts. We suggest several low-cost measures, such as: (1) sending smaller reinforcement packages than divisions; (2) posturing to reduce readiness, ^{equipment} ~~marryup~~, and deployment times; and (3) using existing prepositioned attrition stocks to equip instead those U.S. reinforcing divisions whose

* (U) These are only partly add-ons, since many were also included in the USAREUR and USAFE cuts mentioned earlier.

equipment must presently go by sea. Even in the absence of MBFR, such measures would better attune the U.S. force posture to NATO's current strategy and to current U.S. national guidance. So long as structure in Europe to absorb them was retained, it should be possible to return the 45,400-man equivalent of a 20 percent cut within two weeks. Indeed, airlift makes it feasible to design procedures which could both bring U.S. post-MBFR forces back up to strength and greatly reinforce them within the 23 days between M-day and D-day assumed in current U.S. national strategy.

(U) We also see major opportunities for enhancing NATO's early defense capabilities via richer active/reserve mixes. Posturing to generate more well-trained ready reserves to flesh out or reinforce active forces might be the most sensible European NATO and U.S. response to MBFR cuts, or to cuts in active force levels because of budget pressures even in the absence of MBFR. It would be a low-cost way for our European allies in particular to enhance their initial conventional defense contribution (as suggested by the fact the the FRG Defense Commission has proposed just this solution for the Bundeswehr).

RESTRUCTURING EUROPEAN NATO FORCES (U)

(U) In general, it would be more difficult to absorb MBFR cuts in allied than in U.S. forces, because they are already thinner in peacetime support structure and there are fewer possibilities for substitutions. Probably the most difficult to cut without severe risk would be the FRG forces, which make the largest single allied contribution to Center Region defense. From a military viewpoint, withdrawal only of "stationed" forces would least diminish residual allied capabilities, since they could be postured for quick return.

(U) However, we suggest a variety of means by which allied ground forces could absorb 5 percent to 10 percent MBFR cuts with least loss of residual capability by (1) judicious pruning of marginal personnel and units; (2) greater reliance on cadre/reserve units; (3) reduction of overhead structure and training base, plus civilian substitutions; and (4) various compensatory measures. Deeper MBFR cuts and/or budget pressures would almost dictate extensive restructuring by such means as streamlining division slices, going to a richer active/reserve mix,

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and placing more reliance on territorial forces. Assuming reasonable time for mobilization, this would permit them to field forces comparable in initial capability to before.

The very lean allied air forces would be even more difficult to cut than ground forces. Nonetheless we suggest several ways of absorbing up to 20 percent MBFR cuts if imposed, such as converting air defense missile units to reserve/civilian status, joint training, and cutting marginal units. On the other hand, the allied air forces are so poorly organized in toto to take full advantage of airpower's inherent flexibility that such compensatory measures as an improved Center Region command and control structure, a tactical air control system, more aircraft shelters, rationalization of missions, and cross-servicing arrangements would greatly improve their net capabilities even after, say, 10 percent cuts.

COMPENSATORY TECHNOLOGICAL OPTIONS

In our view, a wide range of low-cost technological options could also be used to help compensate for manpower cuts by strengthening residual capabilities, especially against the WP armor and air threats. We suggest a whole menu of such possibilities; for example, light proliferation AT weapons, improved mines and minelaying, and mini-fortifications to enhance the utility of territorial forces in harassing WP armor. We also suggest a range of improved air and ground munitions, and command/control/communications improvements. But achieving such modernization on the requisite scale within likely resource constraints will demand much greater rationalization of NATO efforts than yet achieved.

COST IMPLICATIONS

We have looked sufficiently into the major cost elements of our restructuring proposals to be able to say with confidence that they could be financed essentially from MBFR savings and related tradeoffs. Over a reasonable period like five years, the estimated \$3 billion savings from a 20 percent MBFR cut -- assuming equivalent personnel reductions in active U.S. force levels -- would more than offset such restructuring costs as added equipment for more units, increased use of

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LN's and reserves, and the like. The chief added needs would be for more equipment for the added combat units, but we suggest numerous ways in which these could be met from existing stocks or normal modernization without true add-on cost. For example, we suggest ways to avoid large buys of duplicate equipment for prepositioning. There would also be sizable annual BOP savings -- an estimated \$280-\$337 million a year in event of a 20 percent MBFR cut. Our proposals for using MBFR as a lever to get greater allied support would produce further BOP savings.

CONCLUSIONS

In sum, we propose a more efficient use of NATO resources to produce a high confidence initial defense posture which could be sustained within likely resource constraints, and after MBFR cuts. Though this entails adopting a new set of priorities and different resource allocations, we contend that only in this way could NATO field adequate forces to implement its flexible response strategy during the Seventies. Naturally a price would have to be paid in such terms as less support and sustaining power, and the calculated risk inherent in posturing on the assumption of more mobilization/deployment time. But we believe that these add up to a prudent level of risk, especially when weighed against the gains described. In any case, such risks seem far more acceptable than those entailed if NATO's current inadequate conventional posture were further degraded by MBFR cuts and other constraints.

158 SPECIFIC WAYS TO STRENGTHEN NATO CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE
WHILE STILL ABSORBING MBFR CUTS*

I. GUIDELINES FOR MBFR

1. Keep flexibility for force restructuring, even at expense of verification (p. 2).
2. Regard MBFR and force restructuring as two sides of same coin (p. 44).
3. To this end, confine cuts to overall personnel levels, rather than cutting units and/or equipment.

II. GENERAL DIRECTIONS FOR NATO FORCE RESTRUCTURING

4. Posture to do *first things first*, instead of allocating resources all across the spectrum (pp. 34, 39-41).
5. Posture more explicitly to meet WP blitzkrieg threat (pp. 41-44).
6. Accept calculated risk of posturing on assumption that NATO could reasonably count on more mobilization-time (pp. 13, 18, 41).
7. Give higher priority to meeting Center Region initial defense needs at expense of capabilities for more sustained conflict (pp. 42, 43).
8. Generate more quickly available ground combat forces to provide defense in depth against armor-heavy Soviet assault (p. 41, Chapters V, VI, IX, X).
9. To this end, design smaller leaner divisions tailored more for initial combat power than staying power and with a lower tail-to-teeth ratio (p. 42, Chapters V and IX).
10. Generate more quickly mobilizable European NATO reserve divisions, similarly configured (p. 43, Chapters V, VIII, and IX).
11. The United States in particular should greatly speed up planned reinforcement of NATO center with ground and air forces (p. 43, Chapters III, V, VI, VIII).
12. Economize on NATO resources by realistic ways of rationalizing its defense posture (p. 44 and Chapters VII, VIII, IX, X).

* Because of the way our study is organized, some 10-15 percent of these are alternatives on overall

III. BALANCED MBFR CUTS IN U.S. ARMY IN EUROPE

13. To enhance deterrence and reassure allies, do *not* withdraw any divisions as such (p. 52).
14. Leave equipment in Europe to facilitate quick return (p. 53).
15. Thin out peacetime manning levels on *unbalanced* basis (p. 55).
16. Take proportional cuts by brigade slices (pp. 56-57).
17. Alternatively, take them by battalion slices (pp. 57-58).
18. Posture forces withdrawn for quick return as specified (pp. 58-59).
19. Go to different active/reserve force mix to replace such forces and economize on equipment (p. 62).

IV. UNBALANCED CUTS BY RESTRUCTURING U.S. ARMY SUPPORT FORCES

20. Engineers: (a) Substitute four Labor Service/Civilian Labor Group (LS/CLG) construction companies for four military construction battalions to save some 2,950 spaces; (b) simplify divisional engineer functions to save 1,750 spaces; (c) substitute German territorial units for most corps combat engineer and bridging functions to save 3,800 spaces; (d) reduce maintenance and depot personnel proportionately to save 250 spaces; (e) reduce engineer topo battalion to save 150 spaces. Total: 7,150 military space savings (pp. 70-80).

21. Signal: (a) Merge or collocate several higher administrative headquarters to save 1,400 spaces; (b) simplify communication procedures for nuclear warhead custodial units to save 426 spaces; and (c) either integrate the present military peacetime grid into the Bundespost system to save about 4,000 STRATCOM and 2,300 signal brigade spaces plus about 1,500 civilian spaces, go to civilian contracting to save around 4,000 STRATCOM spaces plus 300 signal brigade spaces, or double up the peacetime/wartime structure by using STRATCOM personnel as wartime fillers for cadred field signal units to save around 2,500 field signal spaces. Total savings from 2,900 military to 8,100 military plus 1,500 civilian TOE spaces (pp. 80-89).

22. Alternatively, substitute civilian contracting to save 4,000 plus STRATCOM personnel (p. 90).

23. Or cadre field signal units and use STRATCOM personnel as fast fillers to save 2,800 spaces (p. 90).

24. Maintenance: Change replacement and training practices, construct covered garages, go to greater civilianization in maintenance, and place all maintenance directly under TASCOR. Savings: 13,100 military spaces (pp. 90-101).

25. Go to a multi-year training cycle (pp. 94-96).
26. Further civilianize CGEE and missile maintenance to save 1,800 spaces (p. 101).
27. Keep equipment near mint condition (p. 102).
28. Use "contact teams" to strengthen DS capabilities (p. 103).
29. Food Services: Centralize food processing and messing and develop substitutes for field messing to save 4,400 spaces (pp. 104-107).
30. Assign all in-theater medical assets to Medical Command; eliminate 7th Brigade Headquarters; integrate 7th Brigade field units into the peacetime hospital structure; go to Type B manning for ambulance companies. Savings: 450 military and 2,000 civilian spaces (pp. 107-112).
31. Consolidate Army and Air Force medical services (p. 112).
32. Transportation: Position more ammunition stocks forward, plan to drain forward German commercial fuel stocks, dampen peacetime training activity, and substitute wartime German units for peacetime U.S. truck assets to save 3,600 authorized spaces. Assign cars to staff sections minus drivers to save 200 spaces (pp. 112-115).
33. Reduce POL transport (pp. 119-122).
34. Phase out Bremerhaven and other Army activities in the North Sea area. Savings: 350 Army and 700 civilian spaces (pp. 123-124).
35. EUCOM Headquarters: Divest EUCOM of MAAG and other non-NATO planning tasks; merge EUCOM's essential functions into other headquarters. Savings: 1,200 authorized (Army) spaces and 250 civilian spaces (p. 125).
36. Reduce Berlin garrison by 1,000 spaces (p. 126).
37. Merge USAREUR and TASCOC Hqs or assign TASCOC G-4 planning responsibility and collocate TASCOC Headquarters with USAREUR Headquarters. Savings: 600 staff and Hqs support spaces and 200 signal support spaces, for a total of about 800 military spaces (and 400 civilian) (p. 127).
38. SETAF: Retain warhead support detachments but reduce other elements by assignment to the Italians or relocate warhead custodial detachments to the FRG. Savings: 1,150 military and 400 civilian authorized spaces (pp. 129-131).

39. Reduce air vulnerability by dispersing stocks forward, redesigning units, more shelters, etc. (pp. 134-135).
40. Redesign two rear area Vulcan/Chaparral battalions to save 450 spaces (p. 136).
41. Cut three Hawk battalions because of Improved Hawk to save 2,250 spaces while still increasing AD capability (pp. 137-138).
42. Eliminate Nike/Hercules or turn it over to FRG to save 3,714 spaces (pp. 138-140).
43. Eliminate three AD group Hqs to save 775 spaces (p. 140).
44. Reduce AD signal battalion by 300 spaces (p. 141).
45. Cut corps and lower intelligence staffs by 100-200 spaces (p. 142).
46. Consolidate intelligence data handling systems to save 100-200 spaces (p. 143).
47. Civilianize finance disbursing detachments to save 547 spaces (p. 143).
48. Further civilianize four ordnance ammo companies to save 400 spaces (p. 143).
49. Prune Support and Engineer Utility Districts (pp. 143-145).
50. Take proportional cuts in indirect support (above districts, postal, AG, Finance, Health Services, DS maintenance) to save up to 4,208 military and 6,522 civilians (pp. 145-146).
51. By combination of above, absorb MBFR cuts of up to 23 percent of total U.S. forces in NGA, while still not touching 4-1/3 divisions and other USAREUR maneuver units. Or convert any cuts not required by MBFR into more combat units along lines suggested below (p. 149).

V. CUTTING AND RESTRUCTURING USAREUR DIVISION FORCES

52. Replace nine 81-mm mortars in each infantry company with enlarged heavy mortar platoon to save 2,050 spaces (pp. 151-153).
53. Alternatively, convert to four added mechanized battalions (p. 153).
54. Eliminate infantry and tank battalion ground surveillance sections to save 500 spaces (pp. 151-154).
55. Or convert these (and 1,750 division engineer spaces saved in par. 2 above) into five more tank battalions.

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56. Allot 2,400 MP spaces to four wartime motorized infantry battalions (pp. 156-158).

57. Eliminate three helicopter assault companies to save 600 spaces (pp. 158-159).

58. Merge Aviation Group and two battalion headquarters to save 100 plus spaces (p. 159).

59. Alternatively, convert above into AT helicopter companies (pp. 159-160).

60. Or form an AT helo brigade from existing USAREUR assets (p. 160).

61. Restructure H-series armored division, cutting it from 15,400 to 9,600 men in peacetime; with 17 percent fewer tanks and 11 percent fewer men in maneuver platoons but 67 percent more major AT weapons (in wartime it would have 29 percent more men in maneuver platoons, 11 percent more tanks and 121 percent more major AT weapons (pp. 161-168).

62. Restructure H-series mechanized division to reduce its peacetime strength from 15,400 to 9,300 men, with 40 percent fewer tanks but 80 percent more major AT weapons. In wartime, it would have 47 percent fewer tanks, but 60 percent more infantry and 144 percent more major AT weapons (pp. 161-168).

63. Create battalion packages based in CONUS to bring above divisions rapidly to war strength of 13,000 and 12,600 respectively (pp. 166-168).

64. Provide added equipment for above without add-on investment cost by (a) redistributing equipment freed up by restructuring; (b) utilizing some POMCUS stocks; (c) freeing up equipment by also restructuring CONUS backup divisions (pp. 165 and 168-171).

65. By a combination of pars. 20-48 and 54-61 above, take MBFR cut of up to 32 percent from total U.S. forces in NGA, while still fielding 4-1/3 new style divisions, 2 ACRs, Berlin brigade, and AT helo brigade (p. 172).

66. Alternatively, take a 20 percent MBFR cut, while still fielding restructured force of 7 new style divisions plus AT helo brigade (p. 172).

VI. ABSORBING MBFR CUTS IN U.S. AIR FORCES IN EUROPE

A. For Unbalanced 10-percent Cut (3,440 men)

67. Cut 620 from base and transient aircraft maintenance (p. 181).

68. Cut 680 from headquarters staff, support to SHAPE, etc., organic support to Hqs. (p. 181).

69. Use LNs to replace 955 base support, hospital, etc. spaces (p. 183).
70. Transfer two 412L radar sites to FRG to save 445 spaces (p. 178).
71. Cut 305 liaison, management engineering Audit (pp. 178, 180).
72. Cut 435 Other Hqs, etc.

B. For Unbalanced 20-percent Cut

73. Cut 600 more from real property maintenance activities by using LNs (p. 189).
74. Cut 525 more from base support, hospital, etc. by using LNs (p. 189).
75. Transfer air weather service to FRG to save 500 spaces (p. 189).
76. Transfer 870 from RF-4 and F-4 squadrons, tactical air support, airlift support (p. 189).
77. Transfer 235 from USAF security service (p. 189).
78. Transfer 710 more from Other Hqs, etc.

C. For Unbalanced 30-percent Cut

79. Cut 300 more from real property maintenance activities (p. 203).
80. Substitute LNs in base support, hospital, etc. to save 930 more spaces (p. 204).
81. Cut RF-4 squadrons to save 835 spaces (pp. 198, 201-203).
82. Use LNs in base communications facilities to save 315 more spaces (pp. 204-205).
83. Cut 1,060 other spaces from Hqs, etc. (pp. 206-207).

D. Compensatory Air Measures to Offset MBFR Cuts

84. Revise planning to facilitate quick return of all withdrawn personnel (pp. 209-211).
85. Accelerate and augment U.S. air reinforcements (pp. 212-214).
86. Increase dispersal by collocating on 20 allied bases, which would also permit up to a 20-percent MBFR cut in USAFE from RPMA and BOS alone (p. 214).

87. Also disperse munitions along above lines (p. 214).
88. Also reduce vulnerability by building enough added shelters for entire planned M+30 force (p. 215).
89. Posture USAFE more for *initial defensive capability*, including close support, by buying more MAVERICKS, stationing A-7 and ultimately A-10 squadrons, etc. (pp. 215-216).

VII. CIVILIANIZATION AND GREATER USE OF EUROPEAN SUPPORT

90. Employ more civilians in U.S. installations, in addition to cases cited preceding pars., e.g. in corps areas (pp. 223-224).
91. As was done in Vietnam, make more use of civilian contractors or facilities in peace and war; e.g. telecommunications, POL storage and distribution, medical facilities, wartime rail and truck service, shipping, etc. (pp. 224-226).
92. Plan on more wartime use of mobilized allied assets, e.g. to replace LOCPORT package. In connection with MBFR, insist on principle that allies will operate ports of entry and LOCs for forces sent to their defense (pp. 226-228).
93. Also plan on more use of German territorial commands for specified rear area functions (p. 228).
94. Explore quietly reopening civilianized U.S. LOC across France (p. 229).
95. Collocate U.S. ground as well as air units on allied bases to save personnel and costs (p. 229).
96. Expand NATO common logistic support systems, not just NAMSA but in such common services as (a) port operations; (b) shipping; (c) base utilities and maintenance; (d) non-tactical communications, etc. (p. 230).
97. Seek more equitable burden sharing by getting costs of above paid largely by allies, on principle that logistics can no longer be a national responsibility in case of MBFR (pp. 231-232).
98. By same token, don't allow MBFR provisions to preclude such civilian or European military substitutions or burden sharing (p. 233).

VIII. GO FOR QUICKER REINFORCEMENT AND RICHER ACTIVE/RESERVE MIX

99. Design smaller than division-size U.S. reinforcement packages to accelerate deployability (pp. 243-244).
100. Reduce vulnerability via dispersal of smaller reinforcement packages to more European airfields, and stockage dispersal (p. 244).

101. In early stages of alert, send individuals or small groups by commercial airline (pp. 244-245).

102. Preplan for several levels of U.S. alert to reduce political sensitivity (pp. 245-246).

103. Retain an expandable structure in Europe to absorb quick reinforcement (p. 246).

104. Create a USAREUR and USAFE rear Hq in CONUS (p. 247).

105. Consider using Marine divisions in Center Region (p. 247).

106. Modify commercial 747s to make them bulk cargo-capable (p. 248).

107. Revamp Army readiness procedures (pp. 248-249).

108. Limit attrition at sea by staggering reinforcements (pp. 249-250).

109. Use prepo stocks to equip more reinforcement divisions instead of reserving for attrition replacement (pp. 250-251).

110. Revamp Army reserves and use them to flesh out active divisions which have in turn released units to reinforce NATO, thus permitting Army to (a) absorb sizable MBFR cuts; (b) absorb cutbacks in overall personnel ceiling; yet (c) still retain present 13 division force at almost as high a state of readiness as before (pp. 255-257).

111. Flesh out support units with reserves, on FRG model (p. 257).

IX. ABSORBING MBFR CUTS BY RESTRUCTURING ALLIED GROUND FORCES

112. Cut support first before cutting combat forces; reduce overhead (pp. 264-268).

113. Streamline NATO division slice from present 25,000-30,000 to more like 20,000 (p. 267).

114. Strengthen AT capabilities (pp. 267-268).

115. Put greater stress on ready reserves, with peacetime active duty cadres (pp. 268-269).

116. Expand role of territorial forces for combat as well as rear area functions (pp. 272-273).

117. Cut Bundeswehr as proposed by FRG Commission to help absorb MBFR cuts (pp. 272-273).

118. Expand role of Territorial Army (p. 274).

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119. Reduce or eliminate specific marginal FRG units, e.g. airborne divisions (p. 275).
120. Absorb up to 10 percent Dutch MBFR cuts out of large support, overhead, and training base (p. 277).
121. To absorb 20 percent cuts, also restructure RNA divisions to one active and three 25 percent cadre strength (p. 277).
122. Absorb up to 10 percent Belgian MBFR cuts by reducing overhead, cadred support units, and eliminating marginal non-NATO-committed units (p. 278).
123. To absorb 20 percent cuts, also restructure Belgian Army into one active and two cadre divisions (p. 278).
124. Absorb 10 percent cut in BAOR by withdrawing to UK one battalion slice out of each brigade (p. 279).
125. Absorb deeper cuts by restructuring division slice to permit retaining three two-brigade divisions in BAOR (p. 279).
126. Deal with special French problem by urging France to participate in MBFR by (a) moving forces cut by MBFR back a few kilometers across Rhine; or (b) moving back whole corps, since it doesn't have initial role anyway (p. 280).
127. Shift allied AD battalions to Improved Hawk on less than one-to-one basis (p. 281).
128. Take allied manpower savings from shift from Honest John to Lance, for a savings potential around 3,000 men (pp. 281-282).
129. Try to confine MBFR cuts to "stationed" rather than indigenous forces (p. 283).
130. Posture any allied "stationed" forces cut for quickest possible return on alert (p. 283).

X. ABSORBING MBFR CUTS IN ALLIED AIR FORCES

131. Cut other allied SAM units through going to cadre system and civilianization, for savings potential up to 5,570 men (pp. 289-290).
132. Explore joint training to reduce overlap (pp. 290-291).
133. Increase civilianization of support functions (p. 291).
134. Redeploy forces outside NGA if disbandment not required (pp. 292-293).
135. Reduce active Canadian air strength at Lehr to absorb up to

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136. Take 10 percent cut in "stationed" RAF by reducing support and relying on UK base structure (p. 295).

137. To absorb 20 percent cut, also reduce squadron UE to save 970 more men (or place on FRG base on standby (p. 295)).

138. Cut or redeploy Belgian recce and transport aircraft first (p. 297).

139. Cut or redeploy Dutch recce and/or training squadrons (p. 297).

140. Further civilianization, or redeployment, seems only viable FRG option without cutting combat strength (pp. 297-298).

141. Reorganize 2 and 4 ATAFs into single AIRCENT (p. 299).

142. Create NATO Tactical Air Control System, perhaps using existing U.S. BUIC equipment (pp. 298-300).

143. Absorb U.S. squadrons on allied bases (p. 300).

144. Build more aircraft shelters (p. 301).

145. Rationalize air force missions (pp. 302-303).

146. Expand cross-servicing arrangements (pp. 303-304).

XI. COMPENSATORY TECHNOLOGICAL OPTIONS

147. Make more extensive use of AT mines and demolition; develop better automatic minelayer; mate artillery-delivered mine to tactical rocket (pp. 311-315).

148. Proliferate light AT weapons like Improved LAW (pp. 315-316).

149. Use mini-fortifications (p. 317).

150. Specific approaches to improving counterbattery capabilities (pp. 318-319).

151. Improve artillery submunitions (pp. 319-320).

152. Explore potential of cheap one-man jet engine (p. 320).

153. Specific approaches to better airfield interdiction (pp. 322-323).

154. Use strategic bombers for tactical missions (p. 323).

155. Fill gaps in tactical air capabilities, e.g., recce/strike in high threat areas, clear night delivery, anti-radar, LOC interdiction (pp. 325-329).

156. Improve C³ (pp. 329-332).
157. Improve real time battlefield reconnaissance (pp. 332-333).
158. Improve camouflage, simulation, etc. at low cost (pp. 333-335).



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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

CNO EXECUTIVE PANEL
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20350

• IN REPLY REFER TO

OP-00K/bjf

Ser S773

10 SEP 1973

SECRET (UNCLAS upon removal of enclosures)

Dear Admiral Turner,

I am enclosing several recent items which may be of interest to you.

The first is the transcript of an extemporaneous address by Secretary Schlesinger at the National War College last month. It's a good summary of his philosophy as it has evolved over the past several months. It also provides a preview of the concepts contained in the new DPPG which is in final draft form now, and on which you will be briefed at the next meeting.

The second item is a summary of the Komer study on restructuring of U.S. forces in Central Europe. Ambassador Komer will discuss the study with the Panel on the 20th of September.

One further item of news: plans now call for the November meeting of the CEP to be held in London, hosted by Admiral Worth Bagley, the new CINCUSNAVEUR. NATO Strategy and the Middle East will be prominent agenda topics. We are shooting for a date early in the month in order to increase the prospects of good weather, and will be in touch with you shortly to ascertain dates compatible with your schedules. The meeting with SECDEF, which had been scheduled for the November session, has been deferred to the January meeting.

Sincerely & very respectfully,

Bin
W.A. COCKELL
Captain, U.S. Navy

Enclosures:

- (1) Schlesinger address of 21 AUG 73 (Secret)
- (2) Summary of Komer Study (Secret)

SECRET

To Capt Cochell
CEP

Suggest dist in London
at all CEP meetings!

Charles Kersfeld

136 PUNCH, August 1 1973

Red Ensign

In one of Britain's most successful naval exercises for many years, no less than 27 vessels gathered outside the Firth of Forth last week.

"They were warships of every kind," said a naval spokesman later. "Some, for instance, were Russian trawlers. Others were Russian electronic spyships and yet others were Soviet observation vessels. There were also a few Russian cruisers. We learnt a great deal from the exercise."

The British ship taking part was a small frigate, HMS Anonymous, a completely new type of fighting ship.

"We have streamlined it utterly by removing all the weaponry and armament," commented the spokesman. "Its main function, after all, is to attract Soviet observation so that we can study it, and excess weight of guns would only slow it down. Also, the apparent absence of any weaponry puzzles the Russians extremely. You must remember that the role of the modern British navy is not so much to protect our isles, though we could swap a good punch or two if it came to the crunch, but to keep the Russian navy busy. Am I talking too fast?"

"No," we said.

"Not you," he said irritably. "There's a Soviet trawler off Denmark taking all this down. There's nothing the British Navy resents more than being misquoted in Moscow."—*Tass*